Trading Desks Feast while Credit Risk Stalks

Refining margins, sponsor concentration and what the Hormuz crunch means for your counterparty portfolio

Sixth in a series on credit-risk best practices for energy-sector professionals

In Blog 5, we tracked the first hours of the Iran war shock. Five months on, the Hormuz standoff has escalated further. On 13 July, Washington announced a renewed blockade of Iranian maritime traffic and proposed a 20% charge on other cargo transiting the strait. The fee was abandoned the next day, US strikes and Iranian attacks on two Emirati tankers followed and Brent rose 9.6% to $83.30. Remarkably, this was still a quarter below April’s peak. The real story has moved from crude to refined product.

That gap between a contained crude price and an extraordinary products market is where this blog sits. Two stories are unfolding on two different clocks. One is a trading story and it is already written: The Economist reports BP, Shell and TotalEnergies are on course for combined trading profits of $15bn–$20bn in 2026 (“Big oil’s secretive trading arms are having an extraordinary year,” 28 June 2026). The other is a credit story still being written — in refining margins, bankruptcy filings and rating-agency commentary many credit teams haven’t yet connected to their own portfolios.

Trading feels it first

Trading arms profit more from volatility and spreads than from price levels, which is why the effect is immediate. A widening gap between Gulf and Asian crude grades shows up in P&L the same day it opens. TotalEnergies, per the same Economist reporting, earned more than $1bn positioning around unusually scarce Emirati and Omani crude cargoes marketed for May delivery. It’s a fast, well-capitalised bet a credit committee would only see the consequences of much later.

The majors’ trading arms combine three things credit teams should recognise as risk-management assets in their own right: proprietary market intelligence, balance-sheet firepower and a degree of structural and governance independence from the operating business. It’s a case study in what happens when speed of information meets speed of capital allocation — credit risk management should aspire to the same combination, pointed at exposure and collateral instead of proprietary positions.

Credit risk takes longer to show up

Refined product markets are where the shock is landing. Global refined product output remains roughly 8m barrels a day below pre-war levels, even as crude supply outpaces demand. European diesel margins are at their highest since at least 2011, US 3-2-1 crack spreads are at a record, and Asian jet fuel reached about $160 a barrel on 14 July, up from around $100 before the war.

Rating agencies are treating this as a slow-burn credit theme rather than a spike. S&P Global Ratings raised its Brent assumption to $110 for the remainder of 2026 (and $80 for 2027), while flagging “possible periodic interruptions” — a hedge that should matter to anyone building a single-scenario stress test. Fitch’s own June assumption was less bullish, at roughly $87 average for 2026, expecting a return to oversupply once Hormuz reopens. Both predate the 13 July escalation, so treat them as a floor rather than a final word until the agencies update.

That’s the crux of the timing mismatch. Trading P&L can reprice within hours; the full effects on liquidity, covenant headroom, financial statements and ratings typically emerge over weeks or quarters. Credit teams still calibrating to the initial price shock from Blog 5 are, by definition, looking in the wrong place for where the risk is now.

Winners, losers and where credit events hide

Extraordinary trading revenue and extraordinary counterparty stress are the same shock, redistributed. As of 14 July, Gulf refiners had lost around 30% of throughput (roughly 3m b/d), with an estimated 1.4m b/d of regional capacity knocked out by strikes. Russian refiners remain under sustained attack, tightening regional product availability and clouding export flows. Independent and thinly capitalised traders and shippers face a market where wide price gaps reward speed and balance-sheet depth, which is exactly what the majors and large independents (Vitol, Trafigura, Gunvor) have and thinner players don’t.

Broader data supports real distress not just headline volatility: the five-year CDX North American High Yield spread moved from roughly 406bps in March to near 304bps by end-June, even as large US corporate bankruptcy petitions hit 372 in the first half of 2026, which is the highest comparable first-half total since 2010, with Subchapter V small-business filings up 50% year-on-year. Tightening spreads alongside record filings is itself a signal. Public credit markets aren’t pricing a broad default wave, but idiosyncratic stress is already showing up in the filings data.

For a credit portfolio, that’s the pattern to watch for: counterparties locked into their crude or refinery input costs, unable to pass rising prices on to customers, without the balance sheet to ride out a volatile market and dependent on a single chokepoint supply chain with no alternative.

The hidden private equity layer

A significant and concentrated share of counterparties inside energy credit portfolios are backed or controlled by private equity and infrastructure capital, and that ownership layer changes how correlated risk behaves. The scale is substantial: independent research by Private Equity Climate Risks (January 2026) counts 248 fossil-fuel companies backed by just 20 sponsor groups, which is 64% of the roughly 389 energy companies in its dataset with GIP/BlackRock alone holding stakes in 24. These sponsors are large, diversified capital pools with Blackstone, Apollo, KKR, Ares and Brookfield between them overseeing several trillion dollars of firm-wide capital (part of which is allocated to energy and infrastructure) and they are still actively deploying into the sector. Examples include Brookfield’s $9bn acquisition of Colonial Enterprises and KKR’s $50bn partnership with Energy Capital Partners to fund power generation for AI data centres.

What matters for a credit portfolio is concentration by sponsor not just by asset or parent. A counterparty list built on legal-entity names and traditional parent groupings can look diversified while clustering around a handful of sponsors sharing the same fundraising calendar, leverage playbook and lenders.

If one of those sponsors runs into a stalled fundraising effort or its own credit facilities come under pressure, refinancing terms and covenant flexibility can move together across several portfolio companies at once. A shock that looks idiosyncratic on your books may be a single sponsor-level event affecting several counterparty names. We’ll unpack how to monitor for this in a dedicated follow-up.

Downstream credit teams: a cost and delivery problem, not just a price problem

For a supplier of refined product selling into business consumers — airlines, shipping lines, fuel distributors, industrials, utilities — this shock changes what the credit team should be watching for in its own customer base. It isn’t just that “the oil price moved” because a customer’s underlying economics may have shifted faster than their credit file has. Build these into portfolio reviews now:

  • Cost pass-through risk: with prices for key refined products reported 35%–70% above pre-war levels, varying by product and region, check whether customer pricing formulas and payment terms are indexed to what actually reflects current cost, rather than a lagging benchmark like Brent. A customer whose invoices are still set against stale pricing assumptions is a customer who can be caught short and slow to pay.
  • Delivery and performance risk: with Gulf refining capacity damaged and export restrictions shifting, the ability to supply on schedule is under more strain than usual, which raises the risk of non-performance disputes, penalty clauses, and customers seeking out (or threatening to seek out) alternative suppliers.
  • Working capital strain that looks like a payment problem: a customer doesn’t need to be hedging Brent directly to feel a liquidity squeeze. Higher landed cost of goods and longer freight routes (a Cape of Good Hope diversion can add roughly two to three weeks of transit) can strain their cash position well before it shows up as a formal credit event. Treat slow payment as a leading indicator not background noise.

Turning this into portfolio discipline

Three steps worth prioritising this quarter. First, segment the portfolio by transmission channel — input cost, delivery/performance risk, freight and insurance cost, financing/liquidity strain — since the same shock hits each group on a different timeline. Second, stress test against multiple scenarios not a single base case: S&P’s own central scenario explicitly allows for periodic interruptions so credit portfolios should run that same branching logic rather than assuming one clean outcome. Third, close the aggregation gap: a properly integrated enterprise credit platform should materially cut the time needed to see total exposure by counterparty, product and transmission channel.

Bottom line

The Hormuz shock has produced one of the biggest divergences between market winners and credit-portfolio losers in years. Trading arms are booking the gains today because they’re built for speed. Credit risk is arriving on a slower clock through refining margins, damaged capacity and counterparties running out of substitutes, and rating agencies are already treating it as a structural, multi-quarter theme. The firms that close that timing gap will spot the next unexpected credit event before it shows up in a bankruptcy filing. Everyone else will read about it in next quarter’s numbers.

×