Fat Fingers and REMIT Market Abuse Enforcement

by Lorne Chambers, Head of Compliance Solutions at CubeLogic

When it comes to discussions about market abuse in energy markets, few topics stir more debate than firms being penalised for trading errors (or “fat-finger trades”) which are deemed by regulators to be market manipulation. Over the years there have been a surprising number of such cases across European energy markets and not just limited to EU member states. In some cases, firms have escaped with a warning and a minor reputational scuffing, but others have resulted in significant fines and more serious reputational harm, as was starkly demonstrated in a recent case in Finland that has piqued interest in this topic. In this article we take a closer look at these cases along with available guidance from regulators and other stakeholders. We also examine the role that surveillance might play in helping firms to manage this risk.

What do REMIT and the associated guidance say about trading errors and market manipulation?

For the sake of this discussion, we will focus mainly on the European Union (EU) version of REMIT. Article 5 of the regulation places a prohibition on market manipulation with the latter being defined under Article 2(2).  ACER’s REMIT guidance devotes many pages to explaining the interpretation of market manipulation [1] – this explanation also specifically addresses the important question of intent, a topic critical to the discussion about erroneous trading.

The guidance clarifies [2] that under the definition of market manipulation, what matters is whether the behaviour gave or was likely to give false or misleading signals to the market and/or secured the price of a wholesale energy product at an artificial level. The definition notably does not include any element of intent, thus making it irrelevant when determining if the behaviour counts as a breach of Article 5.  This interpretation opens the potential for erroneous trading activity to be considered manipulative under REMIT, provided the other conditions outlined above are present.

Erroneous orders are also explicitly listed in ACER’s REMIT guidance as a potential indicator of market manipulation [3]. Erroneous orders in this context are defined as unintentionally placing orders or entering into transactions that send false or misleading signals regarding supply, demand or price of a wholesale energy product. This definition leaves little room for doubt that intent plays no role in this context.

As we will explore in the next section, many national regulatory authorities (NRAs) across the EU have applied this interpretation in practice, and on occasion with zest. This is not, however, limited to the EU. Several other energy market regulators in adjacent jurisdictions have also applied this interpretation in enforcement cases as we will examine later.

We should also stress however that not all trading errors are automatically considered abusive. They must still send false or misleading signals to the market, which itself is a function of many, often dynamic, market factors in play at the time the error occurred.

As a footnote, in this article we use terms such as erroneous trades, erroneous orders and trade errors to describe trading errors. As described above, ACER’s REMIT guidance uses the term “Erroneous orders” to describe errors involving both trades and orders. While we use these terms as the context requires in this article, readers should be aware of the distinction and that some regulators may pay particular attention to it [4].

A brief history of enforcement cases involving trading errors

From an EU perspective, the recent Kinect Energy case in Finland caught the attention of many compliance officers (see here and here). In April this year, the Finnish NRA proposed a fine of EUR 9.25 million for a significant trade error in the Finnish bidding area in the Nordic Day-Ahead electricity market in November 2023. The error was evidently caused by a configuration mistake after the implementation of a new weather forecasting system which caused the bid volume to be incorrectly multiplied by a factor of a thousand. The error caused Finnish Day-Ahead prices to collapse to the market floor of -500 EUR/MWh for ten consecutive hours (an average price of -203.40 EUR/MWh for the day), with the impact also spilling over into adjacent bidding zones in the Nordic market.

Despite the lack of intent by the firm and the fact that it took several urgent mitigating actions, including publishing an urgent market message (UMM) and buying back a large portion of the erroneous volumes, the Finnish NRA took a strict liability view of the error in determining that it had breached Article 5. The regulator deemed that it had met both the Article 2(2)(a)(i) (giving false or misleading signals about supply) and Article 2(2)(a)(ii) (securing wholesale energy products at artificial price levels) criteria for market manipulation. The regulator characterised Kinect’s conduct as negligent, pointing in particular to the absence of adequate manual and automated pre-trade controls, and to failings in how the company managed the implementation of its new IT system, as aggravating factors.

In contrast, in another case involving trade errors published in 2024 also involving the Finnish NRA, the regulator found both a large European utility’s trading entity and its Finnish subsidiary (as principal and beneficial owner of the traded products) to be liable for market manipulation under Article 5 of REMIT (see here). On this occasion however it did not impose a penalty, on the basis that Finnish law requires a separate finding of intentional or negligent conduct before a penalty can be imposed, and the regulator found no evidence of either. The trading errors occurred on several occasions in 2022 and also involved the Nordic Day-Ahead electricity market in the Finnish bidding area. While there are some similarities between this case and the one described above (such as one of the errors emanating from a forecasting error), and the responses by the firm to the trading errors (such as publishing UMMs), there were also differences which seemed to play an important role from an enforcement perspective.

While this case involved multiple incidents (as opposed to the single incident in the Kinect Energy case), the errors involved lower volumes and evidently had a lesser impact on the market. Also in this case, the trading error(s) involved a third party. In both cases the firms cited a lack of intent in their respective defences. The potential difference in penalty outcomes in the two cases (acknowledging that the penalty in the Kinect Energy case is not yet final) perhaps provides a concerning contrast for firms seeking to understand and mitigate risk in this area.

This 2023 case from the Dutch NRA also serves to illustrate the range of potential enforcement outcomes from cases involving trading errors. In this case, a trader at a Dutch utility accidentally added a “0” to an offer in the Dutch gas market in 2022 which was accepted by the system operator as part of a balancing action. The incorrectly priced offer caused other market participants to follow with elevated offers of their own. This resulted in the system operator overpaying while earning the utility EUR 2.4 million both from the initial error and on subsequent offers which benefitted from the elevated price it had helped to create. The regulator considered the EUR 2.4 million to be illicit proceeds. The utility also failed to notify the market via a UMM. In this instance, the regulator chose not to formally conclude that the firm had breached Article 5 but instead settled for a disgorgement payment of EUR 2.4 million and accepted this binding commitment from the firm to reduce the likelihood and consequences of erroneous trading in future.

In a more recent EU REMIT case, in May 2026 the Latvian NRA announced an Article 5 enforcement action against a state-owned utility involving a trading error in the Day-Ahead electricity market in November 2024 (see here). While the fine imposed against the firm was low (c.EUR 5,400), the features of the case are still informative. According to the company’s own internal investigation, the incident resulted from gross negligence which was compounded by a failure to use automated IT solutions and reliance on manual processes, with a trader entering orders into the system with the wrong buy/sell sign. According to the firm, the trader subsequently attempted to trade back the erroneously acquired volume in the intraday market of his own volition. While the firm quickly informed the regulator and the exchange following their discovery of the incident, it consciously chose not to publish a UMM, contending that it was no longer inside information when the error was discovered.

While many of the case details were not made public, it seems likely that the overall scale of the erroneous activity was smaller than in the cases discussed above. The firm claimed that the trading error was not intentional, and that the firm made several enhancements to its trading controls and systems. In determining the penalty, the NRA scaled the base fine down using a coefficient reflecting the much smaller turnover of the subsidiary whose portfolio was affected, then applied a further 50% reduction for the firm’s self-reporting and cooperation. This resulted in a financial penalty, albeit a modest one.

While the above sample of cases all relate to REMIT actions involving EU member states, these are not the only regulatory jurisdictions in Europe taking such enforcement action. NVE-RME, the Norwegian energy regulator, has conducted several market abuse enforcement actions against firms involving trading errors under Norway’s market conduct rules (which largely mirror REMIT’s market abuse provisions). In 2025, it found that a large utility had violated the prohibition against market manipulation under local market rules for erroneously trading 6,156 MWh in the Day-Ahead auction for the NO2 bidding area on a single day in November 2022 (see here). The size of the error resulted in price impacts across several Norwegian bidding zones (NO1, NO3 and NO5) price-coupled with NO2 for most of the day, extending to all of Norway and Sweden in the final hour, and affected most hours in the delivery day. The firm published a UMM roughly 3.5 hours after the auction results were published. Despite the significant magnitude of the error, NVE-RME chose not to impose a fine while concluding that market manipulation had indeed occurred. More recently Montel, the energy market intelligence provider, reported that a Norwegian aluminium producer and energy trader, had been found guilty of market manipulation involving trade errors in 2024, again involving the Day-Ahead market (see here). No formal notice has been published to date by the regulator but based on reports, the case bears several similarities to the others described above.

Also in Norway, a case announced in November 2023 involving a local electricity-intensive zinc producer that was fined c.EUR 410,000 is worth a mention here, albeit for slightly different reasons to the cases discussed so far (see here). The origin of the case was an erroneous order. A breakdown in internal communication meant that a trader submitted bids into the mFRR balancing and reserve capacity markets (“RK” and “RKOM”) while being unaware that the firm’s smelter was undergoing an extended outage. This left the firm with a capacity commitment it could not fulfil. However, once the mismatch came to light, the firm, acting on external advice, raised its bid price rather than withdrawing it, specifically to reduce the chance of being called upon. NVE-RME treated this second step as a separate matter, finding it to constitute attempted market manipulation, which by definition requires a deliberate choice on the part of the market participant. The case is a useful illustration that regulators may assess the origin of an error and a firm’s subsequent handling of it as two distinct, independently sanctionable issues – a theme we return to later in this article.

Last but not least, and perhaps one of the more surprising developments in this area, in November 2025 the Ukrainian energy regulator announced an enforcement action involving order errors in its electricity balancing market under its local equivalent of REMIT (see here). The activity took place over three days in November 2024 and earned the market participant concerned a fine of EUR 22,000. Limited case details are provided, but again the absence of intent was acknowledged.

Rounding off our discussion on enforcement, what are we able to surmise from the sample of cases discussed above?  The first observation is perhaps the high concentration of cases in the Nordic market, with the Finnish and Norwegian regulators leading the way. The second observation is the large number of cases that involve bid submission errors in the Day-Ahead auction market. The third is the wide range of enforcement outcomes, spanning from no financial sanction or a relatively low penalty to very significant financial penalties and disgorgement of profits.

The fourth, and perhaps the most notable, is that the regulators in question have generally applied a strict liability approach, under which the absence of intent does not in itself prevent an erroneous transaction from constituting market manipulation where the objective elements of the market manipulation prohibition are met.  The Dutch NRA is the notable exception, having declined to reach a formal Article 5 finding at all. That a regulator may choose not to take the strict liability route — while still extracting a substantial disgorgement — is itself instructive for firms assessing their exposure.

The fifth observation, drawn from the 2024 Finnish case involving the large European utility discussed above, is that the strict liability standard described in the previous point applies to establishing the Article 5 breach itself, but does not necessarily extend to the imposition of a penalty. Under Finnish law, for example, a penalty requires a separate finding of intentional or negligent conduct. Where a firm can show that an error arose from factors such as reliance on third-party information, together with the prompt disclosure of inside information and taking other remedial steps, a breach may be established without any penalty following.

A related and sixth observation, illustrated by the Norwegian zinc producer case discussed above, is that a firm’s conduct after an error is identified can itself become a separate point of regulatory scrutiny, distinct from the error’s unintentional origin. This reinforces the importance of what a firm does in the hours and days following an erroneous trade, a topic we explore further below.

Guidance and prevention

Fortunately, several regulators have published guidance over the years concerning erroneous trading in the context of market manipulation.

The Dutch regulator offers this guidance on dealing with erroneous orders. The guidance stresses the need for any error to have as few consequences as possible. As such, it advocates for the rapid cancellation of erroneous orders (most relevant in continuous markets) or the reversal of an error where possible. The guidance also states that it is “more likely” that it will launch an investigation into an erroneous order if a firm does not resolve such errors “properly” or if it takes too few measures to prevent such errors from occurring in the first place.

The Norwegian regulator offers this guidance focusing specifically on erroneous orders in the Day-Ahead market in the context of the Norwegian Energy Act, the relevant provisions of which are based on the EU’s REMIT rules. Interestingly, on the topic of whether an order gives (or if it is likely to give) a false or misleading signal, the regulator addresses the fact that orders in the Day-Ahead market are not clearly visible to other market players given that it is an auction market with a closed order book. This defence was indeed used, albeit unsuccessfully, in the 2025 NVE-RME case referenced above against a large utility. In the regulator’s view, visibility of the orders is not a condition for an order to give misleading signals. This is because, while individual Day-Ahead orders are not directly visible to other market participants, changes in bidding can be reflected in the aggregated supply and demand curves published by the exchange. Also, an erroneous order can directly affect the auction clearing price and therefore the price paid (or received) by all market participants in the relevant bidding zone.

Perhaps the most valuable piece of guidance however comes in the form of the REMIT Best Practice guidance published by the Nord Pool exchange (see here). The guidance was updated in April 2026 to include, amongst other things, a new stand-alone section on erroneous orders [5]. This guidance addresses the handling of erroneous orders more broadly than solely through the lens of market manipulation but places significant emphasis on the disclosure of erroneous orders when they constitute inside information (something which must be done in a timely manner to avoid breaching other provisions of REMIT, such as Article 4). It also draws particular attention to the risk of potentially trading on inside information before the market is made aware of the trading error, a factor that was conspicuously absent from the enforcement cases discussed above.

In the context of human, system, process and third-party errors, the Nord Pool guidance also lays out several measures [6] to either prevent or mitigate the risk of erroneous orders from occurring. The guidance mostly addresses pre-trade measures such as limiting manual steps in the trading process, assigning pre-trade limits, testing and monitoring tools and source data, alerting of potential errors by internal bidding tools, and the implementation of tools to perform reasonability checks etc.

While the Nord Pool guidance in this regard is thorough, and certainly a recommended read, it is light on the role, if any, that post-trade surveillance might play in helping market participants to detect erroneous trading. Notably, the guidance’s own process recommendation for handling erroneous orders begins at the point where “an erroneous order is identified” without addressing how that identification is expected to happen once an order has already been entered and/or a trade executed. We address this topic in the next section.

What role should post-trade controls play?

Some erroneous trading activity, particularly when it has a significant impact on the market, has a greater chance of being detected quickly. But what about situations where the error is less obvious but might nonetheless still qualify as market manipulation? Detecting such errors is important from several perspectives.

The first is that it is always in a firm’s interests to detect potentially abusive behaviour before its regulatory stakeholders do. Such self-identification allows a firm to self-report the issue to the regulator, correct the error (if possible) and demonstrate a robust and proactive compliance culture. It also puts the firm in a stronger position to explain the circumstances, ensuring that it can present the facts and its response clearly and on its own terms. Should a regulator uncover the same failure itself, it will likely draw its own conclusions about the adequacy of the firm’s compliance framework. This is likely to place the firm in a worse-off position. In practice, how a firm responds once an issue is found is often treated by regulators as a signal of the “health” of its wider control environment and can materially affect the tone and outcome of any subsequent enforcement dialogue and penalty.

The second is that the erroneous order might still constitute inside information, even if such errors are only detected several days (or longer) after the event depending on the market. As an independent control function, compliance should not rely exclusively on front office to disclose such errors, particularly given the possibility that a trader might attempt to conceal the mistake while at the same time attempting to trade out of the error to avoid detection. The same principle applies to erroneous orders that are corrected before execution, but which might have had an impact on the market.

The third is that other REMIT obligations potentially come into play should the erroneous trading impact the market. This includes the requirement for certain [7] Persons Professionally Arranging or Executing Transactions (PPAETs) to report a breach to their NRA and ACER under Article 15(2) within four weeks of becoming aware of it. This could apply to an Article 5 breach related to the erroneous trading. It could also apply in a situation where a firm has traded on inside information related to erroneous trading in violation of Article 3, or where a firm has failed to publish inside information in violation of Article 4.

Naturally, there are plenty of valid questions and technical challenges around how to effectively detect erroneous trading activity, particularly without generating an avalanche of false-positive alerts. Is this merely an extension of existing alert patterns, such as those for abnormal trade volumes or price deviations, or does it call for an entirely new surveillance concept built around different logic altogether? And what role might AI play in such surveillance? There is plenty more to unpack here, but that is a discussion for another day – my CubeWatch Trade Surveillance team and I at CubeLogic welcome the debate.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Section 6 from page 73 of the latest guidance (see here).

[2] See paragraph 233 on page 75 of the latest guidance (see here).

[3] See 6.3.2 paragraph 315(l) on page 94 of the latest guidance (see here).

[4] See Section 3.2 on page 14 of this binding commitment from the Dutch NRA (the document is in Dutch) (see here)

[5] See section 3.4 on pages 75 – 89.

[6] See section 3.4.11 on page 83.

[7] See CubeLogic’s blog on the obligations distinct to PPETs (see here)

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