REMIT 2 Implementing Regulations and Opportunities for Transaction Surveillance
In August 2025 the European Commission published its draft Implementing Regulations (IRs) for REMIT 2. The IRs cover data reporting rules under Article 8 of REMIT 2 [1] and new rules for inside information platforms (IIPs) and registered reporting mechanisms (RRMs) [2]. The data reporting topic in particular is highly relevant for transaction surveillance as it directly impacts which data elements are available to both market participants and regulators when performing surveillance, a task now mandated for many firms active in energy trading under REMIT 2. As such, the addition of new reportable data elements warrants further consideration by energy trading firms and transaction surveillance vendors such as CubeLogic. In this article we consider some of the potential opportunities for surveillance that may arise as a result of the new rules.
Background
REMIT’s extensive data reporting framework under Article 8 gives ACER and national regulators the ability to monitor trading activity across EU wholesale energy markets to proactively detect suspicious behaviour that might indicate market manipulation or insider trading. To keep pace with rapidly evolving markets, the REMIT rules were comprehensively revised in 2024 in the form of REMIT 2. Under Article 15 of REMIT 2, transaction surveillance became compulsory for a wider range of market participants, and several new adjacent provisions were introduced such as the strengthened control and oversight of algo trading.
As part of this revision, the European Commission was mandated to revise the REMIT Implementing Regulations for data reporting to ensure their alignment with the objectives of REMIT 2. ACER was enlisted to support the Commission in this endeavour, launching a comprehensive market consultation in June 2024 [3], the results of which were published a few months later in November [4]. Following this consultation, several roundtables were held with broad stakeholder representation to debate the future direction, and extent, of the REMIT reporting changes.
During this consultation process, market participants voiced an almost unanimous preference for minimizing the introduction of new reporting elements, favoring the enhanced use of existing data fields and tables wherever possible. This approach, they believed, would limit the cost and complexity associated with updating and overhauling existing reporting systems and processes.
Fast forward to August 2025. While the Commission’s proposed changes fall short of its original, somewhat ambitious plans, they still introduce many additions that could pose implementation challenges, increase costs, and introduce concerns for market participants about sharing commercially sensitive or confidential information with regulators. At the same time, these changes may create valuable opportunities to enhance transaction surveillance capabilities…
Table 1 Changes: Key Data Fields and Surveillance Opportunities
The original REMIT IRs specified four tables of reportable data with a fifth table being proposed in the latest drafts. For the sake of brevity, we will focus on the proposed changes to Table 1 – that is the reportable details for standard power and gas contracts. Table 1 data is broadly relevant from a transaction surveillance perspective as it covers a significant volume of transactions executed on electronic trading platforms and exchanges, including the likes of EPEX Spot and Nord Pool which provide coverage of the single intra-day coupling (SIDC) market. Below we sample a set of data elements and inspect the potential surveillance opportunities that they might present (there may well be others of course!).
A new Liquidity provision activity field (field 3) shows if an order was submitted as part of a market-making strategy. This field may act as a useful filter for surveillance systems to isolate market making activity, which might otherwise trigger false positive alerts if not accurately identified in the data. Wash trades might be such an example. While certain platforms already make this field available [5] given that it is mandated under MiFID 2’s reporting rules, this would also now be extended to wholesale energy markets.
While the proposal received intense pushback from market participants and Organised Market Places (OMPs) alike, the new Algorithm ID field (field 5) has nonetheless been proposed in the IRs. While the system and process changes needed to implement this field will undoubtedly be onerous, the field would not only provide a clear distinction between human and algo trading, but it would conceivably allow surveillance systems to identify and group individual algos from a transaction surveillance perspective – currently a major challenge for most systems. Enabling this would permit a more thorough analysis of this rapidly growing area of the market, and one which is of central policy interest to ACER and European Commission under REMIT 2. This field may also help to negate the need for burdensome workarounds within current data structures to distinguish such activity. Again, while MiFID 2 has historically compelled financial venues to introduce a similar identifier, this crucially excludes energy exchanges like EPEX Spot and Nord Pool where algo activity is highly prevalent.
The draft IRs propose the introduction of the ID of the market participants acting on a third-party account field (field 9) which aims to more clearly identify the providers of direct electronic access (DEA) services. The proposed field is intended to work alongside the existing Beneficiary ID field which is largely relied on at present to identify DEA arrangements (now field 10 under the draft IRs). While the Commission has elected not to proceed with the full DEA “cascading mechanism” originally proposed (much to the relief of the market!) the first level of data available should help firms that provide DEA services to carve out such activity within surveillance solutions more accurately.
The reporting of bidding strategies was another data element that garnered significant push back from market participants, with many raising concerns over the implementation burden, confidentiality and information security risks, and that it exceeds REMIT’s intended scope. Nonetheless, the draft IRs propose going ahead with it anyway via the introduction of a new Bidding ID field (field 44 under the revisions). The field will identify specific bidding units where the transaction relates to unit-based bidding, or the portfolio to which the bidding relates if pursuing a portfolio-based bidding strategy. The above concerns aside, the field may conceivably provide context for insider trading detection where, at the simplest level, a direct relationship could be established between a transaction and a given generation set. Similarly, it could provide a useful filter when distinguishing, for example, activity that might have the incidental appearance of wash trading involving asset backed and proprietary trading books, but where one leg would now be traceable back to a specific asset providing firmer explainability for surveillance teams.
Finally, the draft IRs propose the introduction of four new index-related fields i.e. Fixing index types, Fixing index sources, Index fixing interval, Fixing frequency (fields 28 – 31 in the proposed revisions). These fields already exist in Table 2 under the current IRs for non-standard transactions but will now also be mandatory for standard contracts. Likewise, a Price formula field (field 46 under the revisions) is also proposed. Will such fields provide opportunities to systemise the detection of cross-product and cross-market behaviours that seek to manipulate price-setting or reference instruments, or contracts that price off them? This could apply to enhancing surveillance capabilities over standardised Over-the-Counter (OTC) transactions which are currently monitored with mixed success.
Beyond the Basics – Incorporating Exposures and Monitoring LNG Trading
Exposures
REMIT 2 introduces a requirement for firms to report 24-month forward looking exposures on a quarterly basis, which includes not only their positions in wholesale energy products but also forecast generation and consumption volumes where applicable. Intragroup transactions would also be included in such reporting. The European Commission, in its Explanatory Memorandum published alongside the draft IRs, envisages use cases where aggregate exposure information, when combined with the transaction data reported to ACER, may help ACER and national regulators to explain situations which could ‘otherwise raise suspicions from a REMIT perspective’.
The Commission provides examples in its memorandum illustrating how exposure reporting can help regulators build a complete picture of a market participant’s activity, including its trading in the context of groups with generation and/or demand portfolios. Context is equally important for market participants: surveillance analysts should aim to view their firm’s behaviour as regulators might. And this is precisely where exposure data might be incorporated into a surveillance system – that is, to help surveillance officers to contextualise, and perhaps explain alerts, and to support replies to RFIs when such context is critical to a firm’s response. However, given the significant pushback on proposed reporting requirement from market participants, it remains to be seen whether it will be included in the final IRs, and if so, in what form.
LNG
While LNG has not traditionally been a major focus of transaction surveillance, this is almost certainly set to change. Since the drastic reduction of Russian gas, and the forthcoming full ban on both Russian LNG and pipeline gas [6], LNG markets are now of critical interest to the EU authorities. As such, LNG was given a prominent uplift in REMIT 2 with, amongst other things, several new provisions under Article 7 including the formalisation of rules around LNG price assessments and benchmark publications. The draft IRs also introduce a new block of LNG-related fields (fields 58 – 68 under the revisions) in Table 1. Cross-market surveillance use cases will undoubtedly emerge and will likely draw on the practices developed for benchmark manipulation monitoring involving assessment windows, including electronic pricing windows such as those managed by the large benchmark providers.
What should market participants be doing now?
Once the REMIT 2 IRs are finalised and adopted in the coming months, market participants should engage their surveillance vendors early to ensure that they are aware of the forthcoming changes, and that they have considered the potential impacts and benefits of the changes as they take effect over the next 18-24 months.
Market participants should also consider the broader implications of the proposed revisions to the REMIT reporting rules taking some of the potential use cases described above into account. If adopted as is, the new reporting standards will introduce some opportunities for surveillance enhancement. Compliance officers should also remain cognisant of the prime motivation for these revisions – that is to better enable ACER and national regulators to surveil market participants’ market activity. As such, the use of the new data to enhance surveillance capabilities should be viewed as more of a must have than a nice to have.
Conclusion
While the extent of the proposed revisions to the REMIT reporting rules are arguably not as extreme as many had first feared, there are still a significant number of changes which will equip ACER and the national regulators with a clearer view over the market’s activities. Compliance teams should take the opportunity presented by the likely lengthy implementation window for the changes to consider not only the risks presented by handing this new information to the regulators, but also the potential upsides from a transaction surveillance perspective.
Footnotes:
[5] Including Trayport via its MAR File service and financial exchanges
[6] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_2138