REMIT 2: The Challenges In Detecting Implicit Capacity Hoarding- Part 2
Introduction
REMIT 2 introduced many new obligations for energy trading firms to consider. Article 13 gives ACER, the EU energy regulator, direct powers to conduct cross-border investigations into, amongst other things, suspected energy market abuse. But what precisely will ACER investigate given that its direct investigation mandate is limited to cases involving activity across two or more regulatory jurisdictions?
The answer to this, from a market abuse perspective, is likely to be implicit capacity hoarding and cross-border wash trades (CBWTs). But what exactly do these behaviours involve and how should compliance go about detecting them? In the second blog of this two-part series, we explain these behaviours and discuss the challenges inherent in detecting them.
Before we set off, however, we strongly recommend that you read our first blog which explains how the EU Single Intraday Coupling (SIDC) market works, and crucially, the foundational concept of implicit capacity allocation. A firm grasp of the concept is a prerequisite for fully understanding this blog.
Why is This Topic Important?
Under REMIT 1, while ACER conducted surveillance across EU wholesale energy markets, its powers were limited to only notifying the national authorities in the EU member states concerned whenever it spotted suspicious behaviour. As it did not have a mandate to carry out investigations itself, ACER relied on the national regulators to act but had no way of compelling them to do so. To address this gap, REMIT was updated in 2024 to give powers to ACER allowing it to undertake market abuse investigations directly when the suspicious behaviour involves the market of two or more EU member states. As ACER aptly highlights in its March 2026 REMIT Quarterly newsletter (see here), “The Agency is given real muscle”.
The agency is in the process of setting up its so-called REMIT Investigations Department (RID), including assigning staff and developing tools and processes to help carry out its new mandate. ACER has signalled its intent to commence its first investigations from the second half of 2026 (H2 2026). In January 2026, ACER published its work programme [1] which gives some insight into how RID will function, and in February, it published RID’s Rules of Procedure [2] detailing how it will go about its business (which includes the possibility of dawn raids). These documents left the market with little doubt that RID’s arrival is imminent.
Armed with its new mandate, and equipped with cross-border and cross-exchange data, ACER is uniquely placed to both identify and investigate behaviour in bidding zones straddling national jurisdictions. Besides incomplete data (i.e. only being able to “see” one side of the border), the complexities involved for national regulators to conduct cross-border investigations has allowed cross-border abuse to largely slip between the cracks. Similar constraints apply to the exchanges (or (Nominated Electricity Market Operators/NEMOs) who, as persons professionally arranging transactions (PPATs), are required under REMIT to monitor for abusive behaviour on their venues. Since market participants can engage in cross-border trading via different NEMOs (such as EPEX Spot or Nord Pool), individual exchanges may not always have a complete view of a participant’s activity across multiple order books or platforms.
In addition, Article 15(2) of REMIT 2 introduces a requirement for firms to actively monitor their transactions in wholesale energy products. Many so-called persons professionally executing transactions (PPETs) are obligated to monitor their trading activities for market abuse (refer to this blog where we discuss when surveillance is compulsory). Perhaps an under-appreciated fact is that under Article 13(8) of REMIT 2, ACER may also use its new powers to scrutinise whether PPETs meet their surveillance obligations as set out in Article 15.
In the aggregate, this means that firms engaged in cross-border trading in wholesale energy products now face a significantly higher enforcement risk involving behaviours like implicit capacity hoarding and cross-border wash trades in the SIDC market.
What is Capacity Hoarding and When is it “Implicit”?
In 2018, ACER published this Guidance Note examining transmission capacity hoarding in EU intraday power markets. Despite being published almost a decade ago, the paper remains highly relevant today and clearly lays out the concept of capacity hoarding and the requisite indicators for identifying it. In the guidance, ACER defines capacity hoarding as being where a market participant:
- …acquires of all or part of the available transmission capacity (ATC);
- …without using it or without using it effectively.
This behaviour could have a variety of motivations. For example, a market participant may use capacity hoarding to benefit from the price difference between bidding zones by preventing prices from converging and/or making it possible for prices to diverge to gain from positions held in different bidding zones.
The guidance distinguishes between two main types of capacity hoarding. One being explicit capacity hoarding, and the other implicit capacity hoarding. The former being relevant to the more ‘traditional’ form of capacity allocation where a market participant would first obtain transmission rights, usually through a separate auction or booking process, and only then subsequently execute energy trades using those rights. The latter however, and indeed the focus of this blog, is relevant to the unique design of the SIDC market where the allocation of capacity is implicit (again, please revisit our first blog if you would like to further understand this concept).
As articulated in our first blog, the SIDC is designed as a continuous implicit capacity allocation market across multiple but interconnected bidding zones. In this market, orders are matched based on their time stamps (i.e. first-come, first-served), prices and the ATC. While the explicit and implicit varieties of capacity hoarding share many common indicators, implicit capacity hoarding has additional indicators very specific to this type of behaviour – we will examine this further below.
So how does implicit capacity hoarding relate to the two conditions set out by ACER in its guidance? That is, how might a market participant acquire all or part of the ATC without using it effectively? The answer to this lies in the concept of cross-border wash trades (CBWTs).
In the SIDC market design, whenever two matching orders are executed across bidding zones, the algorithm allocates the required cross-zonal transmission capacity as part of the trade. If a market participant trades with itself across zones, the transaction still consumes available transfer capacity even though there is no genuine change in economic ownership. This mechanism allows self-trades to effectively reserve or lock cross-zonal capacity.
While many will be familiar with the concept of wash trades, CBWTs extend the concept to the unique design of the SIDC market. That is, market participants can trade electricity between bidding zones by trading with themselves akin to the more common variety of wash trading. This typically involves selling (or buying) power in one bidding zone and buying (selling) it in another. While CBWTs are not automatically abusive – they can in fact have a legitimate use, for example, for balancing purposes – they do allow the market participant to avoid the SIDC’s price setting mechanism and giving them the ability to “self-allocate” transmission capacity implicitly acquired in the CBWT transaction through the implicit capacity allocation process described in our first blog.
In 2023, ACER provided an example of a CBWT in this newsletter (see pages 6 and 7). ACER’s example describes a situation where a market participant causes a price divergence between two hypothetical bidding zones (X and Y) by using a CBWT (it should be noted that this is a simplified example – this behaviour can involve multiple bidding zones across the SIDC).
The market participant plans to benefit from a price divergence between the two bidding zones by executing a CBWT shortly after capacity is released on that border. The CBWT results in a short position in one bidding zone and a long position in the other. The market participant then profits from the price divergence (that it helped to generate or exacerbate) by trading out of both positions in the respective local markets to leave itself balanced in both bidding zones. The behaviour generates illicit profit for the market participant while harming other traders in both bidding zones, whose legitimate orders are bypassed. As the ATC has been consumed by the CBWT, they are forced to trade in their local markets at prices that are at least partly influenced by the participant engaged in the CBWTs.
It should be noted in this example that electricity still flows between the two bidding zones, just not in a way intended in the design and intent of the SIDC where the interplay between supply and demand maximises welfare for the entire market.
In its example, ACER points out that the market participant may also partially or fully reverse the CBWT later in the trading session if the price divergence between the two bidding zones fails to occur. This would essentially leave the implicitly allocated capacity unused. This would also constitute manipulative behaviour considering the two criteria mentioned earlier.
While ACER’s example is idealised and one of many possible scenarios (others are articulated in its 2018 guidance), it serves to illustrate the base complexities involved in implicit capacity hoarding.
Indicators: How To Spot Implicit Capacity Hoarding
So how exactly can capacity hoarding, and specifically, implicit capacity hoarding be identified? ACER’s 2018 guidance provides a useful (but non-exhaustive) list of potential indicators. They apply to both implicit and explicit capacity hoarding although several are unique to the implicit variety. These are summarised as follows:
- Price difference across bidding zones (explicit and implicit) – A persistent or unusual price difference between bidding zones during the trading session which may indicate capacity hoarding because withheld transmission capacity can prevent normal price convergence.
- Portion of the ATC acquired (explicit and implicit) – Capacity hoarding is more likely where a market participant acquires a significant share of the ATC, as controlling a decisive portion can hinder cross-border trading and distort prices.
- Time span between transactions from the same MP (explicit and implicit) – Transactions by the same market participant at the start and end of a trading session may signal capacity hoarding if they effectively lock up transmission capacity for most of the session.
- Direct or indirect reversal of the transaction (explicit and implicit) – Reversing transactions that originally acquired cross-zonal capacity may indicate hoarding because it suggests the capacity was reserved but not genuinely used for cross-border trading.
- Use of wash trades across bidding zones (implicit only) – As described above as CBWTs, being wash trades executed by the same participant across bidding zones in the SIDC may indicate capacity hoarding when used to hoard cross-zonal capacity.
- Introduction of inconsistent orders (implicit only) – Placing orders after a CBWT that would contradict its supposed legitimate purpose (e.g. reversing a balancing position) may signal that the wash trade was intended to mislead the market rather than reflect genuine trading needs.
These indicators are important for compliance officers wanting to identify this behaviour but while ACER defines these indicators, it provides very little guidance on how to practically evaluate them. There is also very little in the way of market precedent and guidance to draw on to help fill the gaps. This is not the only challenge as we discuss in the next section.
The Challenge: Monitoring for Implicit Capacity Hoarding
Given the high levels of complexity inherent in the SIDC market design combined with the concept of implicit capacity hoarding itself, it should not be surprising that monitoring for this behaviour is also highly complex.
The first set of challenges are conceptual – what should a surveillance tool specifically be looking for? As alluded to in the previous section, while ACER spells out several indicators, they do not provide much detail on how firms should evaluate them. For example, what proportion of ATC should be considered decisive (per the second indicator in the previous section)? Or how should the start or end of a potential capacity hoarding act be defined (per the third indicator in the previous section)?
The second set of challenges are technical, specifically relating to the data and analytical capabilities required for detection. Does the surveillance tool have a data modelling capability to competently handle not only granular SIDC transaction data, but also data across several NEMOs like EPEX Spot and Nord Pool? Acquiring data from multiple NEMOs is essential to build a complete picture of the market (this is indeed why these exchanges are often unable to monitor for this behaviour). Likewise, capacity data from the various NEMOs must be ingested and normalised, and this data must be linked with the trade data to enable the assessment of ATC usage.
The third challenge relates to the visualization of all relevant data elements in analysis views, enabling compliance analysts to assess potential breaches effectively. Does the surveillance tool, have the means to visualise data beyond a single orderbook view and integrate the cross-border context into a single view? The latter requires, for example, the price evolution in the two bidding zones, the directional capacity position built up by the participant, and the corresponding ATC situation between the respective bidding zones.
These challenges typically extend far beyond the capabilities of most “standard” surveillance solutions.
Why not just monitor for CBWTs?
Focussing on CBWTs in isolation may seem like one way to side-step some of the challenges outlined above. While still not trivial, it is conceptually more straightforward for a surveillance tool to detect self-trades between bidding zones. But relying on this narrow approach will leave many gaps and blind spots.
CBWTs, per ACER’s indicators discussed above, are only a single, isolated indicator. Without the ability to connect such trades to transmission capacity or to assess their impact on the market, their utility is reduced significantly. There is also the question of timing. ACER’s 2023 newsletter (see here) provided some sobering statistics on the large volume of CBWTs. Between January 2021 and October 2022, around 10% of all hourly products traded in the SIDC were CBWTs (see page 8). In practice, this means compliance officers in many firms will likely be inundated with alerts if only this indicator is considered, many of which will not necessarily be abusive. Data volumes in this market have also exploded in recent years, likely making this issue significantly more problematic.
So how should you detect implicit capacity hoarding?
In short, a tool is needed that combines multiple analytical layers to effectively detect this behaviour. Identifying material CBWTs is only the first step. Then being able to contextualise the amount of transmission capacity tied up by the activity compared to the ATC, a constantly evolving parameter, is critical. Once these fundamental indicators are identified, further analysis on indicators such as duration, reversibility, price divergences and market impact must also be layered in.
Ultimately, implicit capacity hoarding can only effectively be identified through the convergence of multiple analytical layers — not by any single indicator in isolation. A big ask for most surveillance solutions.
Monitoring for Implicit Capacity Hoarding – A Nice to Have or a Must Have?
Amongst the wide range of abusive behaviours prohibited by REMIT, implicit capacity hoarding occupies a unique place. ACER’s new direct investigatory powers are limited to cross-border cases and while this may conceivably involve other wholesale energy products and markets other than the SIDC, implicit capacity hoarding in the SIDC is likely to feature prominently among the types of cross-border abusive conduct that fall within its investigatory focus.
Indeed, ACER’s 2023 newsletter made it clear that the Agency is acutely aware of this behaviour and indicated its intent to strengthen its enforcement under REMIT. While in 2023, ACER did not have the direct mandate to do so – it most certainly does now.
Combined with the rapidly increasing prevalence of algo trading in this market (and the likely increase in CBWTs as a result) and REMIT 2’s focus on algo trading under Article 5a, firms must consider the potential risks of failing to monitor for this behaviour. Particularly in the context of the requirement for PPETs to actively monitor for, and report, suspicious behaviour.
Conclusion
ACER’s new powers under REMIT 2 significantly alter the market abuse risk profile of cross-border trading in EU coupled power markets. Implicit capacity hoarding in the intraday market is likely to be the core focus of the Agency’s investigations. This isn’t theoretical either. It has clearly communicated its awareness of the prevalence of CBWTs in the SIDC market and their potential for being abusive. In H2 2026 they will begin to act.
For compliance teams, this means that conduct which may previously have fallen into regulatory grey areas, or escaped investigation due to fragmented oversight, will now be far more visible to a central authority with access to cross-zonal, cross-NEMO data. Firms active in this market must respond – surveillance in this area is no longer a nice-to-have.
To monitor for this behaviour carries many challenges, both conceptual and technical, given the inherently complex design of the SIDC and the lack of detailed guidance on how to spot this behaviour. As a result, standard surveillance tools are likely to struggle to effectively detect this behaviour. Specialist solutions will be needed that are capable of turning these complex challenges into an effective surveillance model. As H2 2026 approaches rapidly, firms have little time left to prepare.
Please contact CubeLogic at emea@cubelogic.com if you would like to understand more about implicit capacity hoarding and cross border wash trades. As a specialist provider of surveillance solutions for European power markets, we have developed a unique and sophisticated capability to detect this behaviour using an unmatched combination of market expertise, a unique data model capable of handling SIDC transaction and capacity data and a powerful multi-layered analytical engine which addresses many of the challenges laid out in the blog above.
Footnotes: